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Abstract
This essay deals with democracy promotion & protection by established
democracies. It first describes how the dynamics and understanding of regime transitions
changed from the first to the present fourth wave of democratization. Subsequently, it
defines democracy promotion & protection and describes the different components of it.
Finally, it discusses the issue of the strategies of the democracy promoters & protectors
and takes a critical look at the issue of evaluating of their activities.
This essay claims, among other things, that: (1) In general, the goals of the
democracy promoters & protectors are focused on outcomes and less on democracy as
an open ended process or procedure of government; (2) There is no apolitical way to
democratize and, therefore, there is no apolitical strategy to promote & protect
democracy; (3) Democracy promotion differs significantly from democracy protection,
but donors are rarely aware of it; (4) For impact evaluation of democracy promotion &
protection to make sense, three different levels of impact should be distinguished: the
micro, meso, and macro.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION &
PROTECTION
1. Before the 1970s
Efforts by established democracies to promote “their” type of regime in other
countries and to protect these nascent institutions once they have been initiated are not
new. Democracy promotion & protection (DPP) has been a weapon in the foreign policy
arsenal at least since Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points for ending the First World
War. After the Second World War, the victorious Allies were more successful - in large
part, because they not only defeated their autocratic opponents militarily and compelled
them surrender unconditionally, but they also occupied them for a lengthy period and
played a concerted role in establishing new political institutions. In those places where
DPP was more pacific, indirect and/or respectful of national sovereignty, it produced
much less impressive results. Spain and Portugal remained authoritarian until the mid-
1970s. With few exceptions (Costa Rica and, later, Venezuela and Colombia), the
countries of Latin America returned to military dictatorship after brief post-war
democratic interludes. The “institutional transfers” from European democracies to their
former colonies in Africa and Asia rapidly reverted to single-party or military regimes
(with the important exception of the Republic of India). The United States conferred
democracy upon the Philippines only to see the country turn authoritarian and its
continuous military presence in South Korea did not prevent the advent of autocracy
there.
In essence, the lessons of DPP prior to the post-1974 wave of democratization
were not very encouraging. Not only did it seem that, in order to succeed, the effort had
to be protracted, costly and direct - but it could easily be “trumped” by other more
pressing foreign policy objectives. For decades, the Cold War and bi-polar military
stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union led many Western
democracies to support “useful” autocrats and to be rather wary of the disorderly and
assertive politics of “non-aligned” democrats.
The academic literature on regime transition did not invite outsiders to embark
upon democracy promotion & protection. It stressed, among other things, that virtually
all non-democratic countries manifestly lacked the “pre-requisites for democracy”.
Ingenious statistical analyses “proved” beyond any doubt that countries below a certain
average income, without an independent middle class or urban bourgeoisie, with low
levels of literacy and education, without the benefits of Protestantism and British
colonial rule e così  via stood little chance of ever becoming democratic. Had potential
proponents of DPP relied on this scholarship, they might well have concluded that it was
worthless to spend any money or thought on promoting democracy anywhere. It would
have been much more productive simply to support “political order” of any type and
hope that, eventually, economic development would change the terms of the equation. In
sum, whatever the reasons were, DPP was not practiced extensively before the 1970s.
2. After 1974
Since the unexpected events of the Portuguese Revol ção dos Cravos in 1974,
over fifty countries have attempted to “transit” from different forms of autocracy toward
different types of liberal political democracy. In their interdisciplinary and interregional
research on this ‘wave’ of democratization, scholars have tended to revise their
assumptions about how, why and where democracy comes about. They emphasized the
generic importance of uncertainty during regime change and, hence, the role of specific
agents acting in unprecedented ways (and in a considerable hurry) with very imperfect
information and very fragmented partners. This, combined often with a momentary
element of popular enthusiasm and the mobilization of civil society, implied that the
“normal” constraints of social structure, economic necessity and even cultural
predisposition could be suspended. Agreements (pactos) could be reached that would
have otherwise been highly unlikely. Moreover, if these “transitional” arrangements
survived long enough, they might just provide the basis for more stable and mutually
rewarding rules that could induce actors to play a democratic political game – even in a
limited way with quite imperfect results when compared with the well-established liberal
democracies of the West. From this new perspective, much of what the earlier literature
had described as “prerequisites for democracy” became “products of democracy” –
provided that the actors in these neo-democracies (both rulers and citizens) could agree
to play according to a mutually satisfactory (if far from optimal) set of rules for
competition and cooperation. Scholars who analyzed these new dynamics of regime
transition and consolidation, newly christened “transitologists” and “consolidologists,”
came to a number of conclusions that are still tentative and controversial, but they
include the following:
First, in very few cases of democratization did the actors (or members of the
scientific community) foresee its occurrence. Ind ed, most happened in settings where
the existing wisdom had declared that for cultural or structural reasons, democracy
should not have occurred (or, if it did emerge for some unusual reason, it would soon
fail).
Second, in their (admittedly, ex post) efforts at explaining these unprecedented
outcomes, analysts stressed factors relating to human agency over the determinants of
social structure or cultural habits. There seemed to be more of a margin for collective
choices and assertive actions than was previously assumed.
Third, although all cases had some elements in common (especially, the role of
uncertainty and contingency), there was a great deal of difference in what came to be
called “the mode of transition” (four of them have been distinguished - pact, imposition,
reform, or revolution)ii, which was stressed as an important intervening variable between
national structural factors and the contingent regime-level outcome. And, not only did
these regime changes take place through a diverse set of actors and processes, but these
differences seem to be having an enduring impact on the subsequent outcome, i.e. upon
the likelihood of consolidation and the type of democracy.
Fourth, the factors that lead to the demise of authoritarian regimes and the actors
who benefited politically from this transition process were often not the same as those
that favored an eventual consolidation of democracy. “Transitology” and
“consolidology” consequently emerged as distinct (but related) sub-disciplines with
different variables, basic assumptions and emergent properties.
Fifth, many fewer countries reverted back to autocracy than in previous periods
of regime change. Indeed, in several instances when this was explicitly promoted by
military or auto-golpe (e.g. Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela) the effort failed.
3. Expansion and Diversification of DPP
There are a number of differences between the present wave of democratization
and previous ones. The most striking is that “modern liberal democracy” has emerged as
the only legitimate political regime in most (but not all) parts of the world. Virtually all
regime-changers at least proclaim that their intention is to consolidate some form of
democracy.
Not only does this literally “invite” established democracies to play a role, but the
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Imperium removed most of the residual justification
for their supporting authoritarian regimes for reasons of international security. During
the 1980s and especially the 1990s, the idea took hold that intervention in the internal
affairs of sovereign countries for humanitarian reasons (and also for DPP) was not only
possible but almost obligatory. In any case, it became much easier to justify
internationally and domestically. Le ders of Western democracies became confident that
their respective citizenries would support efforts to promote & protect democracy
abroad, even when and where traditionally defined national interests are not at stake
(provided, it should be added, that these promotional efforts do not cost too much in
public funds, military casualties or commercial concessions). Moreover, they seem
increasingly convinced that their institutions, rights and practices provide the model that
is applicable worldwide. To this end, public authorities and private groups have altered
their organizational structures, their internal practices and their resources allocations.
This “offer to intervene” found a corresponding demand in “consuming” neo-
democracies and quietly generated vested interest in what has been defined as “the
growth industry of democracy promotion & protection”.iii
The variety of actors involved in the DPP business has become very diverse. In
addition to Western governments bilaterally interacting with their newly democratized or
possibly democratizing counterparts, multilateral organizations of a global or regional
nature have begun to play a much more salient role, already in the path-breaking cases of
Portugal, Spain and Greece. Even more unprecedented has been the emergence of a vast
panoply of private associations, foundations, charitable organizations and social
movements, most with their headquarters and source of support in established
democracies, but interacting with (and, in many cases, sponsoring the formation of)
counterpart organizations in politically liberalizing or democratizing autocracies or in
consolidating neo-democracies.
Obviously, an actor-centered and contingent approach towards regime change
leaves a good deal more room for explicit policies of DPP. During those uncertain
transitional moments and, subsequently, in the process of consolidation, the room for
maneuver is greater than within “normal” democracies. Initial, often seemingly minor
decisions can potentially have a major and accumulative “path-dependent” impact. While
this is, ex hypotesi, the case for both domestic and foreign participants, most of the
scholars who adopted this approach tended to discount the role of outsidersiv. To a
certain extent, this might have been an accident due to the fact that the early
“transitologists” focused exclusively on events in Southern Europe and Latin America.
These cases not only occurred in countries with repeated experience in trying to establish
democratic institutions, but also before the established democracies had realized the full
extent of change that was in the offing and, therefore, before they had put together the
public and private organizations to deal with this unexpected occurrence. The
subsequent regime transformations in Asia, Africa and, especially, Eastern Europe
brought with them a manifest need to include the international context more extensively
and systematically.
Academics have responded to this new context by converging to an
unprecedented degree on a definition of political democracy as a ethod or procedure
of government, rather than as a type of society or a distinctive range of substantive
policy outcomes.v They have also rapidly produced a set of assumptions, concepts and
hypotheses that purport to explain and guide the complicated and uncertain process of
regime change to a successful outcome. The embryonic (but rapidly growing) sub-
disciplines of “transitology” and “consolidology” can provide an analytical framework
for evaluating the impact of DPP – even if it has apparently been of limited utility for
those who have been designing its projects and programs.vi
The following are tentative and controversial conclusions of “transitol gists” and
“consolidologists” regarding the international context and DPP:
First, all the democratizing countries since 1974 have been affected by the same
processes of diffusion across national and regional borders. Directly or indirectly, their
choices and outcomes influence each other -- often across what seemed to be
impenetrable barriers of space, language, culture and level of development.
Second, the international processes through which they have learned from each
other and been influenced by others have been growing stronger over time. The initial
domestic democratizers in Southern Europe could hardly have imagined what was
coming, nor could potential foreign promoters & protectors of democracy have realized
what tasks lay ahead of them. Those arriving late in the wave have found a very different
array of supportive international organizations and policies.
Third, the instruments for the international promotion & protection of democracy
have evolved and proliferated. Old-fashioned, unilateral coercion by national
governments has not completely disappeared (vid  G nada and Haiti), but it has been
largely displaced by, among other things, threats and promises of an economic nature
(from boycotts to promises of most-favored-nation status), contingent on a country’s
human rights and political performance.
Fourth, what is also novel for this wave of democratization is the emergence of
multilateral systems of political conditionality. Formerly restricted to the realm of macro-
economic and monetary policy and applied by the IMF, the explicit attachment of
rewards, sanctions, memberships and exclusions to a wide range of regional and global
intergovernmental organizations - and their monitoring by an even wider range of non-
governmental organizations - has become a fairly standard component in today's
international environment. Needless to say, the existence and efficacy of multilateral
political conditionality varies a great deal from place to place. Nowhere is it stronger,
however, that in the network of obligations and opportunities surrounding the European
Union.
Fifth, another novelty is the rapid expansion in DPP programs and projects that
are located within target countries and actively encouraged or at least passively tolerated
by the authorities of these countries. A  impressive quantity of external actors has been
assisting in liberalizing, democratizing or consolidating regimes by re-writing their
constitutions, designing their electoral systems, teaching their party members how to
campaign, helping civil society organizations to lobby, socializing individuals to “proper”
civic values and behavior, and encouraging trade unions, business and professional
associations, and state agencies to set up forms of (good) governance.
4. Domestic vs. International Factors
At the same time, however, the emphasis that “transitologists” initially placed on
the domestic determinants of the outcome of democratization should not be so easily
discarded. Embedded in its inductive origins are several more enduring theoretical
propositions:
First, democracies, much more than au ocracies, rest on the contingent and
voluntary consent of citizens that their rules of competition/cooperation are appropriate
for that specific national political formation.
Second, in the rapidly changing and uncertain context of the transition itself,
outsiders even more than insiders have difficulty identifying actors, parties and
movements that can be relied upon to produce desired effects.
Third, once the consolidation of some type of democracy has become the
primary issue, then, foreigners with their greater experience and technical knowledge
might be expected to play a greater role, but by then the natives will have established
their own preferences more firmly and developed their own expertise.
Fourth, insomma, the net impact of external DPP upon democratization is likely
to be only marginal in determining the outcome - and, hence, singularly difficult to
measure and predict. Its efficacy will depend very much on the way that it is “processed”
through domestic actors which, in turn, implies the content of DPP will have to be
tailored both to differences in national points of departure and modes of transition.
Standard “treatments” are not likely to produce standard effects.
Fifth, nor is there likely to be much of a correlation between the sheer magnitude
of DPP in a given country and its net impact. Hopefully, that impact will be positive (as
intended), but too much of it might well result in de-legi imation when the rules and
practices it encourages are perceived as “owned” by foreigners, rather than produced by
and for natives. In the best of circumstances, therefore, DPP should be a “self-canceling”
policy instrument. The less of it for the most circumscribed period, the better. The
institutions that it is intended to promote and protect should become capable of
extracting their own resources and justifying their own rules as soon as possible.
II. DEFINING AND DESCRIBING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION &
PROTECTION
1. Defining Democracy Promotion & Protection
Democracy promotion & protection is a subset of activities in what has been
labeled as the international context or international dimensions of democratization, i.e.
all external actors and factors that affect the political regime situation in a specific
country. Democracy promotion & protection can be defined as follows:
Democracy promotion & protection consists of all overt and
voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or
indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors
explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of
autocratic regimes, democratization of autocratic regimes, or
consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries
This definition excludes, among other things, covert activities by external actors
(e.g. “quiet” diplomatic efforts or activities of secret services) as well as indirect
activities (e.g. literacy campaigns, improving a population's health, generic forms of
propaganda, or promoting economic development). Their exclusion from the definition
of DPP should not be interpreted as implying that they have no impact on political
liberalization, democratization, or consolidation of democracy, but just that they are
qualitatively different in intent and origin. Moreover, the effects of these activities upon
regime change are generally very hard or impossible to observe and analyze. The
definition also excludes activities adopted, supported and implemented exclusively by
domestic actors. In addition, it excludes a number of factors of the international context
“without agency” that could positively influence democratization, i.e. all forms of
imitation, contagion, learning that emerge from the “normal” transactions between
persons and countries.
Our definition of DPP does include a large variety of activities, such as sanctions,
diplomatic protests, threats of military intervention when they are used conditionally
upon the democratic behavior of recipients, activities to promote the observance of
human rights, to educate to civic norms, and the transfer of institutional models - such as
supreme courts, legislatures, and electoral and party systems.
This predominantly “phenotypic” definition of DPP based on stated actor
intentions should not always be taken for granted because, first, these actors may have
other, less overt, priorities - for example, promoting economic reform, maintaining a
certain foreign policy, or keeping migrants at home - that might even conflict with the
declared one to promote & protect democracy. Second, and much less likely, external
actors may engage in activities that they themselves do not define and consider as DPP
but, unexpectedly and unintentionally, might actually do the job.
2. Distinguishing Democracy Promotion from Democracy Protection
In the studies of political regime changes from autocratic to democratic regimes,
three qualitatively different processes have been distinguished: (1) political liberalization;
(2) democratization; a d (3) the consolidation of democracyvii.
The process of political liberalization is made up of two core elements: (1)
increasing quantity and quality of political liberties; and (2) encouraging the de-
stabilization or eventual collapse of autocratic regimes. The process of democratization
is a process in which a minimally democratic regime is established. The process of
consolidation of democracy is qualitatively different from the former two processes
because it aims at sheer survival of a (newly) established democracy by introducing
elements of predictability in an effort to avoid, first of all, a relapse into autocracyviii.
Measures that are considered to be useful to consolidate newly democratized regimes
can have a negative impact on the collapse of autocratic regimes and the establishment
of democratic regimes. For example, reinforcement of the rule of law might stabilize not
only a neo-democracy, it might also stabilize an autocracy. ix It is therefore of strategic
importance to distinguish between the promotion of, on the one hand, political
liberalization and democratization and, on the other hand, the protection (consolidation)
of democracy. Thus, the overarching concept of DPP is made up of two qualitatively
different elements, which can be defined as follows.
Democracy Promotion consists of all overt and voluntary activities
adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by
(public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute
to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the
subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific
recipient countries
Democracy Protection consists of all overt and voluntary activities
adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by
(public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute
to consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries
3. Different Forms of Democracy Promotion & Protection
Besides the huge increase in the number of DPP activities, at least two additional
major changes regarding DPP have taken place over the past two decades. First, a shift
from coercion in the form of the threat to military intervention to conditionality in the
form of threat of sanctions and promise of rewards to promote and protect democracy.
Second, related to the first, the sharp increase of cases in which DPP takes place in the
target countries themselves in the forms of programs and projects. The latter
development is the result of the existence of a minimal consent (and sometimes outright
enthusiasm) of target countries to politically liberalize and democratize. Sometimes,
however, such consent is more apparent than real where, for example, incumbents
perceive it to be better to tolerate DPP within their countries in order to avoid potential
sanctions or to obtain potential rewards.
The combination of two characteristics – (1) nature and degree of consent of
the authorities of the target country; and (2) primary location of DPP implementation -
give rise to four different types of DPP which are represented in Table One.
=> Place Table One Here (Democracy Promotion & Protection) <=
The form of DPP of the first (top left) cell - coercionin the form of military
intervention and occupation - was relatively often used historically to unseat autocratic
regimes or to avoid relapse of democratic and newly democratized regimes into
autocratic regimes. Although its use has diminished, cases such as Grenada, Panama,
Haiti, and Iraq show that this form of DPP has not been completely abandoned.
Conditionality - the second (top right) cell - in the form of imposing or threatening to
impose sanctions or providing or promising to provide rewards in order to promote or
protect democracy, has quantitatively and qualitatively changed since the 1970s. First, a
shift took place from bi-lateral to multi-lateral sources of sanctions. Second, there was a
change from imposing sanctions to providing rewards. The latter generally takes the
form of (increased) development aid or accession to a prestigious club of international
actors - Central and Eastern European states' accession to the European Union is the
most powerful example of this instance. In this second cell one finds also transmissions
by radios such as the Voice of America and support for opposition in exile since they
also have their primary location of activity outside the target country and are generally
implemented without the consent of the authorities of target countries.
Cell number three (bottom left) includes activities that are implemented in the
target countries and which need a minimum of “consent” of the authorities of the target
countries, for example electoral assistance or assistance to develop civil society. These
activities are labelled as internal democracy assistance. Cell number four (bottom
right) comprises activities that need also minimal consent of the authorities of the target
country, but take place abroad, often in the donor country (e.g. judges of the Egyptian
Supreme Constitutional Court visiting their counter parts of the US Supreme Court).
These activities are labeled as external democracy assistance. To underline the fact
that external democracy assistance takes place under different conditions than internal
democracy assistance and is potentially less effective than the latter, we associate it with
the term contagionx as opposed to consent.
The analytical distinction between non-consensual and consensual forms of
democracy promotion & protection is not as empirically neat as it may seem, hence, we
have introduced a substantial gray area in Table One of “tolerated” democracy
promotion & protectionxi. As mentioned above, a target country may allow programs of
DPP to be developed within its borders because it either fears that otherwise sanctions
will be imposed or, alternatively, that it will not receive some potential rewards.
The “package” of DPP activities aimed at a specific target country depends on a
few major elements: the regime situation in the target country; the political will of its
incumbents to democratize; the interests of the democracy promoters & protectors; their
technical knowledge of regime changes; and the instruments they have at their disposal.
For example, in the case of a country that is at an early phase of political liberalization
and has a reluctant ruling coalition, external actors can threaten sanctions, promise
rewards, and attempt to develop democracy assistance within the target country - all at
the same time. In the case of newly democratized regimes, external actors may lift
sanctions and continue to promise rewards in exchange for further democratization and
consolidation of democracy, and they can simultaneously expand the scope of
democracy assistance.
4. Democracy Assistance
The major novelty of the 1990s has been the quantitative growth and qualitative
diversification of democracy assistance (DA), i.e. programs and projects that are
adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) actors
predominantly in recipient countries (cell three of Table One) and to a more limited
extent in donor countries (cell four of Table One). By the end of the 1990s DA is made
up of thousands of programs, tens of thousands of projects, adopted and implemented by
hundreds or thousands of donors in maybe hundred countries around the globe, totaling
hundreds of millions or even billions of US dollars. The activities involved range from
training parliamentarians how to better perform their role, educating individuals to claim
their rights and do their duties as citizens, assisting the creation of local organizations
that monitor elections or government policies, to helping to (re)write constitutions.
The first criterion we have used to distinguish between different types with this
wide variety of activities is the question of who or what is ta geted by DA: individual
citizens, civil society, political society, or the state. Individual citizens are exposed to
programs that aim specifically and primarily at increasing their knowledge about
democratic institutions, changing their values and, eventually, their behavior. Civil
society organizations of different kinds are targeted - e.g. private voluntary groups
(often providing services), advocacy NGOs, interest groupsxii - that aim at creating better
conditions often for a limited group of individuals. Politic l society organizations -
particularly political parties - aim usually at general political change. State institutions
are subject to programs of reform in order to create, among other things, a more
accountable and transparent set of public authorities.
The distinctions between these four categories are not rigid. For example, in
highly restricted political environments, civil society organizations act more like political
movements that seek to mobilize large segments of the population against the
incumbents and may even serve as the basis (at least temporarily) of an alternate
government. The difference between organizations in civil and political society is an
important one, since it is our conviction that political liberalization and democratization
and, to a lesser extent, the consolidation of democracy are political - s opposed to
technical or a-political - processes of change. Regime change involves political struggles
between competing powers that eventually result in the production of rules. Addressing
directly these struggles and powers is profoundly different from not addressing them or
addressing them indirectly, as is attempted with a-political or technical strategies of
political transition and consolidation, as most donors do.
A second criterion to distinguish between the variety of democracy assistance
activities is to ask the question about the goal of these programs: promotion of
democracy or p otection of newly established democratic regimes? For example,
training police personnel to become more effective in crime repression and respectful of
human rights invokes the protection of democracy and can hardly if ever considered to
be a form of democracy promotion. Assisting political parties and social movements to
mobilize in favor of regime change is a clear instance of democracy promotion and could
actually have a negative effect on democracy protection. This second criterion should
also not be interpreted too rigidly. For example, civic education could have a positive
effect both on initial democratization, as well as on the consolidation of democracy. In
some cases, supporting trade unions which act as a political force bringing down an
autocratic regime is a form of democracy promotion, while supporting these same
organizations in their effort to become private interest governments, might have a
positive effect on the eventual consolidation of neo-democracies.
In Table Two we combined these two criteria, target level and the goal of DA
activities (i.e. promotion or protection of democracy).
=> Place Table Two Here (Democracy Assistance) <=
In each cell of Table Two examples of targets of DA are provided. These
examples should not be interpretated rigidly. A number of things are implied in Table
Two. First, short to medium term activities to promote democracy are more contingent
and, hence, are less likely to be effective in protecting newly established democracies.
Second, pragmatic support for the judiciary, the police, and the military and incentives
for decentralization are much more likely to have an effect on the later processes of
consolidation of newly established democracies than on initial political liberalization or
the first steps toward democratization of autocratic regimes. Third, the medium to long
term democracy promotion activities and the democracy protection activities tend to
overlap significantly. Civic education, support for independent media, the creation and
professionalization of advocacy groups can have effect on both the democratization of
autocratic regimes and the consolidation of democracies, but are more likely to affect the
latter. Fourth, the cells of Table Two that are marked dark gray contain activities that
seem to be the most appropriate forms of DA given the specific transition phase. For
example, to promote political liberalization or democratization, a donor would have
potentially more impact concentrating on the political society than on individual citizens
or civil society.
Table Two is not exclusively descriptive. It can help to throw light on the critical
issue of donor strategy, although it can not be read by donors (or analysts) as if it
constituted a ready-made guide about what to do under specific circumstances. For the
sake of illustration let us assume a donor wants to contribute to a transition from an
autocratic to a minimally democratic regime. As we noted in the first section of this
essay, four “modes of transition” from autocracy to democracy can be distinguished:
pact, imposition, reform, or revolutionxiii. The first two modes of transition are
determined by elites. A pact is made when elit s agree upon multilateral compromise
among themselves. An imposition occurs when elites use force unilaterally and
effectively to bring about a regime change against the resistance of the incumbents. The
latter two modes of transition are strongly determined by the masses. Reform occurs
when masses mobilize and impose a compromised outcome without resorting to
violence. Revolution occurs when masses rise up in arms and defeat the authoritarian
rulers militarily. The donor, taking the specific regime situation of the target country into
account, has to decide which of the four modes of transition to democracy it prefers to
take place and, consequently, who has to be targeted by its democracy promotion
activities. If it favors a pacted transition or an imposition, the natural target level will be
the state (albeit different elements within the state institutions). If it favors reform, it
should focus mainly at facilitating and assisting mass mobilization, thus targeting political
society. At the same time, however, some of the state institutions might be targeted, i.e.
those that eventually will be willing to make compromises with the (representatives) of
the masses. If a donor favors revolution as mode of transition it should also focus on
mass mobilization, without compromises with elite factions. This analysis implies that
assistance to civil society and to individual citizens will have little effect on the
democratic transition while it is expected to have a larger impact on the consolidation of
newly established democracies.
In the following we describe briefly each of the four target levels of democracy
assistance represented in Table Two. Individual Citizens are generally exposed to civic
education. It aims generally at transferring knowledge about democratic institutions and
practices, socializing individuals to democratic (civic) values, and changing their
behavior. Sometimes civic education focuses training of individuals of why and how to
cast votes in elections.
Civil Society. Democracy assistance targets organizations that are at least
partially voluntary and relatively independent from the state. They include, first and
foremost, private associations that are formed voluntarily and spontaneously and that
focus on the delivery of services to their members and often to non-members too. They
also include, however, NGOs that are entirely or pre-dominantly based upon voluntary
participation (but not necessarily on voluntary contributions) and that focus on policy
advocacy for the production of public goods that cannot exclusively appropriat d by
their members. Third, associations representing class, sector, or professional interests are
part of civil society, although they are often controlled or even run by the state and may
even have compulsory membership under autocratic regimes. Four, assistance to
‘bowling leagues’ and ‘bridge clubs’ and similar types of civil society organizations is
generally not considered to promote or protect democracy. Programs for assistance
consist of one or more of the following items: providing financial resources and
equipment, training organizations' members/personnel in skills, socializing them to
norms, and transposing organizational models.
Assistance to service delivery associations increasingly involves elements of
policy advocacy. Some donors argue, therefore, that this should be seen as a form of
democracy assistance, since it aims at enhancing accountability and transparency at the
local level. Support for advocacy movements, especially by US donors, is considered to
be the most important instrument to promote and protect democracy. In the case of
support of human rights organizations under restricted autocratic regimes, this is
certainly the case; however support for think tanks that contest economic policies of the
same regimes is less likely to contribute to democratization (pace what donors
themselves say about it). Support for interest groups, such as business associations,
professional syndicates, and trade unions, would seem to do little to promote democracy
(except if these groups convert themselves into political movements), but it may
contribute significantly to regime consolidation once the transition is over. In any case,
supporting them can help to create greater social support for policies of privatization,
deregulation or other liberal economic reform, even when they have little impact upon
democratization and that might actually be the main goal of the donor.
Political Society. Rightly so, a USAID official observed that all forms of
democracy assistance are political in the sense that foreign intervention in a target
country always arouses controversy, even for such seemingly innocuous tasks as civic
education for the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods. For us, external support for
political society involves assistance to the specialized organizations and movements of
political society. These actors potentially represent the interests and passions of large
segments of the population. Moreover, they compete which each other for office, both
against the incumbents of an autocratic regime and within democratic electoral
processes. Because these parties, movements, and networks do compete with each
other, any foreign intervention - including training parliamentarians and party cadres,
supporting the (re)structuring of political parties, assisting in campaigns - is bound to
affect the terms of this contest and can lead to accusations of manipulation and
differential favoritism. In a generic sense, political assistance encourages political actors
to accept democratic rules for political competition and to reduce uncertainty. But
differences in other characteristics of political assistance depend on its ultimate goal:
promoting transition to democracy or protecting newly democratized regimes to relapse
into autocracy. In the case of democracy protection, political assistance aims at
increasing stability. While in the case of democracy promotion it aims at the de-
stabilization of the autocratic regime in order to give way to a democratic regime.
State Building is intended to support institutions of public authorities, not to
improve their repressive capacity, but to reform those institutions that have made
democracy work in liberal Western democracies. This involves such things as equipping
legislative bodies with computers to create data bases of their activities and existing
laws; setting up documentation services regarding legislation of other countries of the
world that might be used to inform law makers while drafting new legislation; and
training of their personnel in order to manage these flows of information and to perform
better their institutional roles. Judiciary bodies, especially Supreme or Constitutional
Courts, have become a main focus of institution building assistance, providing them with
electronic databases on legislation and decisions of foreign supreme courts and to set up
exchanges between judges of other courts. Police apparatuses are modernized and
personnel trained to become more respectful of human rights. Rarely is the military
assisted in the same way and to the same extent as the police, even though in many
countries the need to promote civil control over the military is fundamental for a
democratic experiment to start and to survive. Finally, territorial decentralization and
functional deconcentration of public authorities has become a major component of
institution building assistance, presumably on the grounds that devolving power to
regional, provincial and local institutions serves as an incentive for greater citizen
participation which would be a stimulus for democratic transitions as well as a check on
the likelihood that newly democratized regimes relapse into centralized autocracies. The
main objective of all state building is to make state agencies more efficient, transparent
and accountable with the assumption that this type of assistance will make the new
regime more stable. Inversely, however, when provided to existing autocratic regimes, it
may make an eventual democratic outcome less likely.
III. DONORS AND STRATEGIES
1. Donor Statements and Strategy
By strategy, we usually mean a set of assumptions about causal relations and
expectations about reciprocal behavior that underpins a chosen course of action. In the
case of DPP, such a strategy should include both technical and operational guidelines for
setting up programs that are likely to have a positive impact on political liberalization,
democratization, and/or the consolidation of democracy. An overview of donors’
statements about strategy indicates that this is rarely the case. Most of the time, strategic
statements are nothing else than more extensive and abstract statements about goals.
When they provide an explicit account of how these goals are to be reached, i.e. how
such programs are supposed to weaken autocracy or strengthen democracy may rely
heavily upon such intervening conditions as “civil society,” “pluralism,” “local
involvement,” whose relation to democracy is regarded as unproblematic. Moreover,
these concepts are almost as nebulous and difficult to assess as democracy itself.xiv
Indeed, some even use them as synonyms for it! The Canadian International
Development Agency locates its activities within a broad conceptual framework where
“democratization,” “human rights,” and “governance” are interconnected, while the
nature of this interrelation neither described and nor translated into specific policy
instruments.xv This (deliberate) under-specification of intermediate goals and their
ultimate effect precludes actors from specifying (much less adopting) safe, reliable and
precise strategies. Rather, it seems to serve the purpose of establishing a “discourse” or
normative language that is flexible enough to be shared by many donors and to be picked
up by most recipients, thus fostering a semblance of coherence and facilitating a modest
degree of coordination. Some donors have straightforwardly expressed their doubts
about the necessity to defining an all-encompassing and all-binding strategic framework.
Japan, for instance, has overtly opted for a very pragmatic stance and does not consider
the definition of any “specific policy” as a sine qua non condition for sound programs to
be implemented.xvi
When we turn to the part of donors' strategic statements that concern
operationalization or implementation, we find a more fine-tuned approach. Recently, this
has undergone important modifications. DPP was initially limited to the transplantation
of a limited set of institutions and procedures believed to be constituent of democracy, at
least in the case of the US.xvii Subsequently, donors have taken more into account the
local context and the dynamics of political change. As a result, they have started to
develop more flexible and responsive strategies. In the USAID document quoted above,
for instance, there is a novel emphasis on context-dependency: “social, political,
economic, and cultural realities” are said to inform the type of programs adopted. A
growing sensitivity to timing has also become very important: in the same document,
USAID insists on the fact that “timing can be critical,” and that “one-time events (…)
can jump start the democratization process.” In other words, donors seem to become
cognizant of the fact that during the process of regime change “critical junctures” can
emergexviii. Timely and appropriate external intervention during these “windows of
opportunity” can have an impact that may be deeper and more persist - even one that
establishes a new pattern of “path dependence” toward the consolidation of democracy.
2. Implicit Determinants of Donor Strategies
Analyzing a strategy does not only involve interpr tating subtle conceptual
differences embedded in documents or in the pattern of implemented programs. Much of
the actual internal discussion about what works better can only be understood in the
light of domestic debates in the donor country. For example, when the issue arises
whether a potential donor government should intervene in a specific country that is still
autocratic and to what extent or in which sectors, the discussion on alternative options
will not only be determined by technical views, past experience, or reasoned
assessments. What is lso at stake (if not overtly so) are the objectives of the donor
country's foreign policy. As recently was observed in the case of the US, “what is really
under discussion are not pragmatic judgments about what works and what doesn’t (…)
What really is at issue, however, is more fundamental than the question whether the ‘rule
of law’ needs to be established before elections. The truth is, many of the people
advancing such arguments don’t care one way or the other. (…) Debate over democracy
promotion is really just a proxy for a larger war over the overall direction of American
policy abroad and at home.”xix DPP has increasingly provided a generic framework for
the foreign policies of all Western countries. Therefore, the nature of strategic thinking
about it cannot but reflect deep-seated beliefs about the importance of domestic patterns
of democracy, the definition of a “safe” international environment for a given country
and the international role that its leaders envision for it. This relation between DPP and
foreign policy has been rendered quite explicit in the so-called “democratic peace” thesis,
i.e. the world-wide expansion of democracy, it is argued, fits the US security interests
and favors the flow of international trade.xx
The linkage between DPP and less principled, more “realist,” conceptions of
foreign policy points at another determining factor. If it is s metimes difficult to establish
a strategic link between normative statements of purpose about democratization and the
magnitude and content of specific programs, it is because donors – in particular,
government donors – also have less publicly “confessable” purposes, that are better
pursued if they can be dressed up contributions to democracy. Put bluntly, the
motivations of donors cannot be derived simply from their own statements of purpose -
and this makes it all the more difficult to assess whether DPP really has been successful.
3. Implicit Goals of Democracy Promotion & Protection
The “unconfessable” purposes can be of a very different nature, ranging roughly
from the economic to the political. They can be limited to the recipient country or have a
broader intended impact. For instance, DPP frequently has been used as an instrument
for promoting economic liberalization. This has been the case in the Middle East where
some donors emphasize those aspects of political liberalization that serve economic
purposes.xxi For example, the creation of a safer and more attractive context for foreign
capital flows can be found behind the emphasis on establishing the “rule of law,” which
becomes reduced to a mere concern for more stable and predictable legal framework for
commerce. These programs aiming at economic liberalization usually assume that the
donor country will derive benefits from the creation of freer markets for consumption,
investment and production, even if the impact of this upon democracy promotion &
protection is by no means clear. In extreme cases, economic benefits are directly built
into donor activities under the form of clauses restricting procurement to its own firms.
As far as confessedly political goals are concerned, it is useful to distinguish
between two strategic orientations. The first concerns the establishment and
consolidation of generic political processes, uch as free and fair elections or collective
bargaining between capital and labor - without regard who wins or loses in these
processes. The second is concerned precisely with these outcomes namely, helping one
political party to win elections or one social partner to strengthen its bargaining capacity.
Obviously, this conceptual distinction is not always easy to make empirically. Programs
aimed at strengthening the electoral process easily lend themselves to discrete forms of
partisan sponsorship. Policies in pursuit of economic liberalization almost always imply
that specific organized interests (business associations and, even more, trade unions) not
be involved in “market distorting” practices with obvious consequences for the
distribution of benefits.
Strategies of DPP can also be informed by political goals at the international or
regional level. For example, the peace agreement between Egypt – still relatively
authoritarian – and Israel - generally considered to be a democracy which deprives a
substantial percentage of those residing in its territory of full citizenship rights - is used
to justify limiting DPP activities in Egypt because a more democratic regime in this
country might take a less benign position toward Israel. Other donor objectives reflect
their domestic policy concerns even when these are to mentioned.In the case of
continental Europe, one can argue that some DPP programs are aimed at containing
migration flows from recipient countries on the grounds that a more democratic regime
should be better able to satisfy the demands of its subjects and, hence, they would have
less incentive to leave - although available data shows no convincing correlation between
the nature of the political regime and the economic performance of a country. This
policy has been particularly apparent in the relations between European Union members
and the Maghreb countries.
4. Bureaucratic Factors Influencing Strategy
Inevitably (but variably) donor strategies are influenced by bureaucratic structure
and organizational culture. They also differ along a continuum running from
governmental to private types of donors. Governmental agencies are more likely to be
constrained by domestic political calculations, if not by overt pressures, while NGOs
seem to enjoy a wider room of strategic maneuver - hence, the tendency for the former
to “off-load” tasks on the latter. Privately managed organizations drawing on public
funds – such as the National Endowment for Democracy, for instance – combine both
features. From an organizational point of view, one can hypothesize that governmental
agencies depend more upon bureaucratic structures with their more complex, slower and
more cautious decision-making processes. Smaller organizations, especially if they are
private and spending private money, seem more likely to respond more quickly, to adopt
more flexible strategies and to be willing to take greater risks. The time elapsed between
implementation and feed-back also should vary significantly depending on the same
factors. Access to financial and technical resources will also be a discriminatory element
in the strategy adopted. The smaller budgets of most NGOs should orient the donor
toward small-scale, cost-efficient strategies, while government agencies spend more on
overhead costs, planning, research and evaluation. This, incidentally, does not guarantee
better results for the latter, but it does generate more data for the analyst.
Organizational factors also seem to have an impact on the involvement of
recipients in the implementation of projects. As mentioned above, donors with tight
budget constraints, especially private donors, tend to rely on local agents for the
implementation of projects, although recent developments have also placed budget
constraints on large, publicly funded agencies. But these constraints are usually of a
different kind. Government donors have to produce evidence of efficiency and success –
the so-called “Management for Results” approach – to its domestic consititu nts. As a
result, they tend to dedicate more funds to evaluation, although these may have little or
no effect on revising their overall strategy.
IV. EVALUATING DPP: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
1. Double-Role of Evaluation for Donors
In the previous section, we sketched the emergence of the global democratization
agenda because it provides the framework within which evaluation issues are formulated.
More precisely, it is within this agenda that the parameters regulating evaluation
procedures have to be set. Only from clear, reliable and precise statements of purpose
can criteria to assess impact be derived. However, by using a single label, “Democracy
Promotion & Protection,” to cover such a wide range of external interventions we have
made the task more difficult. There are two (related) problems. First, the conceptual
stretching that characterizes donor discourse on democracy. Second, the very general
terms in which their objectives are formulated. The current proliferation of public and
private organizations claiming to promote democracy, no doubt, contributed to
broadening the scope of activities falling under that rubrique. In the process, the concept
of democracy itself has been so stretched that it now covers such a wide range of items
that it is of little analytical utility. For example, “conflict prevention” is often included
within the scope of DPP, even though it is not always obvious that it contributes to
democratization. Using the label indiscriminately entails the risk of confusing a means of
legitimation with a statement of purpose and makes more difficult the selection of
appropriate criteria for evaluation. One can do a good job in preventing conflicts or
designing economic reform programs without necessarily making much of an
independent contribution to regime change, even less the consolidation of democracy.
Conflicts can be resolved by undemocratic means. Democracies are supposed to be
compatible with a wide range of economic policies. These activities should be assessed
and evaluated according to their own criteria, not according to their potential impact on
the evolution of the polity toward Western democratic forms. The wider the conceptual
scope of DPP, the looser will be the probable relationship between the achievements of
democracy promoters & protectors and the democratization process itself.
Another obstacle to the design of sound assessments is the high degree of
generalization and abstraction of the terms in which donors couch their objectives. They
leave a great deal open to subjective interpretation. Civil society assistance provides a
typical example of how the description of DPP programs tends to undermine any
evaluation effort. What one finds in the donors' documents is a set of convergent
assumptions and beliefs about the positive contribution of civil society to democracy en
général – a set of ideas which is particularly difficult to translate into appropriate
practices. Everybody agrees that some type of civil society is a major element of
established democracies, while the crucial role of grass-root mobilization in the fall of
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has reinforced the idea that some type
of civil society is a major requisite of democracy. This powerful example has certainly
convinced donors that civil society is a “good thing”. Yet, it seems that donors ignore
the possibility that units of civil societies are not all homogeneous, liberal, democratic
and unified. More often than not, they are ridden with conflicting claims to
representations, competing world views and rivalry over resources and power positions.
They can even mobilize around ethnic or religious cleavages that are mutually intolerant.
Donors seem to assume that units of civil society are necessarily independent of the
state, even destined to oppose the use of public authority, when in many cases civil
society and state interests are intertwined, even self-reinforcing around national
interestsxxii. Not surprising then, an overview of the documents and statements on civil
society assistance by major don rs reveals that a rigorous definition and a corresponding
typology of organizations are still lackingxxiii.
In practice, when donors support civil society, they tend to concentrate their
efforts on highly visible advocacy NGOs and think tanks based in the national capital
that have a Western structure and, often, are staffed by European or US trained
personnel. This implies an exclusion of specifically political organizations (i.e. political
parties and related movements). To change autocratic regimes, mass political
mobilization is often necessary and this is most often organized and guided by parties
and their allied movements. The end result is hardly neutral. External donors select
specific social groups or organizations in civil society according to their criteria and
values, and favor them over others. Being more explicit about these political or strategic
goals would allow for the formulation of more apposite criteria for later evaluation. The
German political foundations, which are the least transparent among contemporary
democracy promoters & protectors tend to adopt evaluation procedures and program
designs that involve specific and often partisan political goals and avoid vague
generalizations and claims about democratization writ large.
The train of thought in current research regarding the role of civil society in
explaining economic performance and the entrenchment of democratic practices rests on
the notions such as “trust” and “social capital,” which, apart from being controversially,
are not easily converted into operational guidelines. If associability as such generates the
civic virtues that sustain institutional performance and democracy, why should the
donors not sponsor bowling clubs and bridge clubs, instead of NGOs?
2. Unintended Effects of DPP
Program evaluations rarely address the issue of the possible unintended effects of
the projects under scrutiny. Policy outcomes can get distorted and they can generate
negative as well as positive externalities. In other words, it is not sufficient just to
measure the extent to which a specific goal has been reached. The “complete evaluator”
has to deal with the entire array of changes emanating from a specific program or
project. It is a common temptation to limit the notion of impact to those results which
bear a manifest relationship of causality to the statement of purpose of the donor and to
overlook side-effects which do not seem related at first sight. It is all the more tempting
to do so since only the former type of impact entitles one to address the narrow issue of
project success or failure - the two notions which really seem to matter to policy makers
and donors. We will briefly examine some possible side-effects of donor intervention.
Donors are often perceived as ‘external actors’ who provide support from
outside and limit themselves to transferring resources and know-how to partner
organizations that carry out their own agenda. Whether they “strengthen institutions” or
“build capacities”. Their role is usually presented as that of mere “facilitators” who
provide technical or logistic support. In other words, their intervention does not seem to
alter the nature of the partner organization. Recent research has shown that the donor-
recipient relationship is much more interactive and does affect the behavior, the structure
and the political status of the recipient. These unintended side-effects are usually
overlooked and yet they constitute potentially very important factors in the overall
impact of DPP. Although the language is usually that of “equal partnership,” the actual
donor-recipient relation is one of dependency. For many NGOs entering into such a
relation with a donor organization means putting the emphasis on activities compatible
with the donor's goals and conceptions and it sometimes means modifying one's
established and links to the community or constituency it serves. Recipients tend to
develop upward linkages and accountability to their don r which is potentially
detrimental to downward accountability to their membersxxiv. Whether as recipients or
contractors of external organizations, NGOs run the risk of loosing their identity as they
absorb external organizational norms and standards. This is not necessarily a matter of
“donor capture.” Recipients are not always passive targets that are selected according to
donors' standards. They tend to adapt to the discourse of the donors and to pay at least
lip service to their values and ideas in order to increase the likelihood of funding. In a
similar manner, the increasing number of organizations on the DPP scene and the
“associational explosion” of the past decades have contributed to shaping a very
competitive market for donor funds. As a result, the organizational culture of NGOs has
undergone tremendous changes, increasingly relying on managerial competence and
financial skills and, thus, shifting the emphasis from militancy and voluntary action to
technocracy and paid labor, with its concomitant dose of depolitization.
Unintended effects of democracy assistance can also be due to inter-donor
communication. There is much evidence that information exchanges and consultative
groups between donors have been instrumental in developing a broad consensus about
the goals and norms of DPP. Differences between donors are less substantial than in the
past, and they are mostly differences of emphasis on diverse components of a broadened
but increasingly unified agenda. Some organizations will have a more normative
approach; others a more technical one. Some will deal with the judiciary and human
rights, others will focus on elections. Such differences express a division of labor among
the donors rather than a divide in political or ideological purposes. As an important
consequence of these developments, whomever they turn to, potential grantees will find
similar standards and expectations, and virtually identical conceptions of political
development and democratization. In other words, there is a discrepancy between a
coherent and unified agenda of the donors and a diversity of objectives and working
methods among the recipients. It is unclear the extent to which large donors, in
particular, can foster heterogeneity in their programs to promote civil society
development. Too much coordination among donors entails the risk of creating “super-
grantees” which penetrate the donor network simply because meeting the requirements
of one donor means meeting those of others. This, in turn, generates a divide between
those recipients which accept and adapt to donor norms and thus enjoy funding, visibility
and a certain influence - often represented or chaired by locals educated in the UK or the
US, sharing a certain managerial culture with the donor - and those that are excluded
from the game.
Evaluating such side-effects and devising ways to avoid them is not easy,
although, some tentative guidelines can be formulated. Fi st, it should be possible to
include in the project evaluation an analysis of how recipients evolved over the long run,
not only in terms of enhanced efficiency or advocacy capacity (formal or technical
qualities that are supposed to be increased by external assistance), but also in so far as
their agenda of activities, substantial commitments and public discourse are concerned.
The evolution of linkages with various social groups that it represents or interacts with
should also be taken into account. Second, if they want to avoid unintended effects of
“donor capture” or of recipient “opportunism,” donors should de-dramatize project
failure and explicitly adopt a more experimental stand. This might mean not sponsoring
always the same type of organizations or even the same organizations, even if they have
proven to be reliable and successful partners. Donors are usually reluctant to explore
such possibilities for several reasons. In the first place, for political foundations or state
agencies, failure means primarily misallocating public funds for which they are
accountable, which impunes their own legitimacy. To prevent this, donors have tended
to develop rather tight selection and monitoring procedures and to favor x te
assumptions over ex post assessment. These guidelines strongly limit the possibility for
experimenting with diversified working methods, recipients and types of operations.
“Private” donors, such as the Soros Foundation, may be better equipped for adopting an
experimental approach, but they are sometimes viewed with contempt by official donors
who charge them with “splashing money around” without any coherent strategy. In any
case, their scale of operations and flexibility allow them to be more innovative and,
sometimes, more cost efficient.
3. Conceptual Limits and Political Constraints of Evaluation
If unintended effects of democracy assistance programs are important and
deserve more attention, existing approaches to evaluation raise problems on their own.
Their limitations can be explained by two factors: institutional constraints and conceptual
obstacles.
Institutional constraints. A wide range of institutional, financial and political
factors shape the extent and the procedures of evaluation. The domestic context in
which donors operate and their constraints in terms of accountability, accountancy and
political legitimacy are the most salient aspects of the multiple pressures bearing upon
their activities and public statements. Actually, donor concern with evaluation is
relatively new. The pace of political events and democratic transitions in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, as well as the high level of demand for technical or political assistance,
induced donors to put emphasis on pragmatic and quick responsiveness - rather than on
planning and evaluation. Only when domestic and public concern arose about the high
levels of expenditure for foreign aid and the benefits derived from it (especially in the
US), did donors find themselves under pressure to produce signs of success and,
thereby, to legitimate their activities. An organization such as the National Endowment
of Democracy, for instance, has been living under the threat of seeing its yearly
endowment refused almost since its inception. The evolution of public finances in donor
countries and budget cuts affecting their institutions contributed to building up such
pressure. Evaluations have provided donor agencies with a means of producing public
proofs of usefulness and success, and of meeting the requirements of official accounting.
This domestic orientation certainly explains why “assessments of political aid programs
are generally positive in terms of their impact on the process of democratization and tend
to exaggerate the significance and contribution of these programs”xxv. Seen in such light,
evaluation reports can be understood as being primarily motivated by accountability
requirements. Although they are not the same thing and obey a different logic, the
boundary between the two notions is blurred in practice, since evaluation reports serve
domestic purposes as well. Donor accountability to their ministries or parliaments should
not be confused with program evaluation - a practice which is unfortunately rather
common. While accountability concerns reporting the formal and proper use of funds
assigned to the donor, evaluation focuses on the impact of the programs. Too often,
evaluations limit themselves to merely accounting for operational expenses and
correlation with the political developments in the recipient countries. Accountability
then, facing a vague description introduces strong biases in the assessment procedure,
especially toward highly visible projects. This is rather obvious in the European Union's
Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme evaluation, which takes as one of its assessment
criteria the visibility of the projects.xxvi While visibility is clearly instrumental for the
donor in terms of domestic accountability, it may be argued that most visible projects are
not necessarily the ones that have more impact. Finally, the context of budget cuts which
most donors face entails an important consequence for the practice of evaluation. Since
it often serves the purpose of justifying donor spending in an adverse context and to
reassure worried controllers, evaluation has paradoxically become a central issue
precisely when less funds are available for it. In such a situation, donors face the risk of
dedicating too much resources to evaluation operations, thus furthering decreasing their
volume of field operations. Potential recipients, in that case, will be the first victims of
budget cuts. In comparison, small donors with limited resources and small structures
tend to develop cost-effective evaluation procedures. They avoid intermediaries such as
consultants and favor direct relationship with the recipients. The French Fondation Jean
Jaurès, for instance, does not conduct evaluations as such. Instead, direct feedback from
the recipients is systematically gathered and used as a corrective device. This kind of
demand-driven or recipient-driven evaluation may not be very illuminating about the
broader impact of the concerned projects, but it certainly makes the donor more
sensitive to the recipient's point of view, which is not always the case with the
standardized quantitative evaluation procedures.
Conceptual obstacles. Scholars and observers agree that there is no generally
accepted method for evaluating DPP programs. Rather, there exist a variety of donor-
specific approaches. Evaluation research has also outlined the main obstacles that can
undermine the validity of existing evaluationsxxvii. According to Mark Robinson, these
are of two kinds: “the methodological shortcomings of existing approaches are that most
evaluations either focus on measurable project outputs or seek evidences of impact in
terms of contribution of donors to the macro-level political change.”xxviii The latter tends
to assume rather than to prove the impact of individual projects on the entire process of
democratization, even in the absence of any clear causal relationship between the two. In
spite of the difficulties, donors continue to claim the existence of such a relationship,
even when they are aware of the conceptual pitfall. The evaluation of the European
Union's Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme, while stressing the constraints such as
a “clear set of indicators by which one can single out the impact of a special project” and
“the lack of counterfactual evidence” which would allow one to “know the outcome for
the institutions if the programmes had not been established,” still attempts to measure
impact against the “contribution of the projects to substantive [sic] democracy”.xxix This
example shows that evaluation shortcomings are better explained by other reasons than
mere conceptual obstacles. Donors are usually eager to underline their contribution at
the highest level of political development and formal evaluations, more than explicit
statements of purpose, provide an opportunity to do it.
In order to avoid such problems, some donors focus instead on direct project
(micro level) impact, without seeking to build complex causal chains from the micro to
the macro level. The main advantage of this approach is to put emphasis on objective,
limited and measurable results. However, the risk in putting too much emphasis on
quantification is to take into account only short-term visible and intended effects, while
ignoring long-term processes that are less easy to monitor and rarely lend themselves to
quantitative assessments as well as unintended effects.xxx
4. From Two to Three Levels of Evaluation and Analysis
As we have seen, two levels of analyses and evaluation have been used by
democracy promoters & protectors. The macro - i.e. the political regime - level is
where, for a variety of reasons, donors argue that their activities have significant impact,
albeit they never provide convincing proof of it. Instead, on the micro level - i.e. the
level of targets of their projects such as single organizations, institutions, or individuals -
donors engage in significant evaluation efforts. However, in micro evaluation, donors
prefer analyses of output (e.g. the number of participants in a civic education project)
over the analyses of outcome (e.g. the extent to which participants increased their
knowledge and changed their values and behavior after having been exposed to a civic
education project). In addition, as we saw, they don't look at unintended effects of their
projects and they adopt a very limited time frame which begins at the beginning of
project implementation and stops at the end of the implementation.
Increasingly, scholars and practitioners are looking for middle-range approaches
that would go beyond mere output measurement and would take into consideration
political and social impact in a limited contextxxxi. I  fact, a potentially more promising
level to analyze DPP is the meso level or partial regime level. We have defined as
partial regimes: “systems of linkages and sets of distinctive rule between authorities and
a variety of social groups, thus defining multiple sites for the representation of these
groups and the resolution of possible conflictsxxxii.” Ins ances of partial regimes are,
among other things, elections, party systems, NGO legal and political environments,
territorial representation (e.g. federalism, decentralization), civil-military relations, labor-
capital relations, ethnic relations, division of power between the executive, legislative,
and judiciary, etc. A meso perspective, acknowledges that even if donors provide
assistance to a single NGO, this affects large parts or even the entire NGO community
and the relationship between the community and the state/government. In practice,
donors do much more than providing assistance in the forms of projects to single NGOs.
For example, they increasingly lobby (or force) target countries' governments to take a
more positive stand towards NGO , including adopting new more liberal NGO laws. In
addition, and very importantly, donor projects never consists exclusively of the transfer
of financial means to, for example, a NGO, but include necessarily the transfer of
information, equipment, skills, norms and institutional models. Finally, donors do not act
in a vacuum or interact with a passive recipient. In fact, donors are strategic actors that
interact not only with recipients - which are strategic actors themselves - but also with
other actors at home (e.g. their parliaments) and in the recipient country (e.g.
governments), including other DPP donors. For these reasons, it seems to be more
promising to analyze the relations between a specific and limited subset of organizations
and/or institutions that are subject to DPP, than to exclusively focus on the micro or on
the macro level. Micro level analyses of outcomes can be useful instruments for sound
meso level analyses, especially if they also focus on unintended effects and adopt time
frame that precedes and extends beyond the life of the project. Macro level analyses can
only be based upon meso level analyses. For example, if DPP has had a positive effect on
advancing the observance of human rights under an autocratic regime, such DPP
activities can be said to have had a positive effect on the political liberalization of a
country with an autocratic regime. Or, if DPP has had a positive effect on creating large
political movements to mobilize for regime change, such DPP activities can be said to
have had a positive effect on the democratization of a country with an autocratic regime.
And finally, if DPP has had a positive effect on civil-military relations (in the sense that
the military accepts to not interfere with politics), such DPP activities can be said to
have had a positive effect on the consolidation of democracy.
---+++---
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Table One
Democracy Promotion & Protection
Primary Location of Activity
Inside Target CountryOutside Target Country
Non-
Consensual
Coercion
Military Intervention /
Occupation
Conditionality
Sanctions / Rewards
+
 Support for Opposition
in Exile & Voice of
America Transmissions
“Tolerated”
N
a
tu
re
 a
n
d
 D
e
g
re
e
 o
f 
‘C
o
n
se
n
t’
 f
ro
m
 T
a
rg
e
t 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Consensual
‘Consent’
Electoral, Institution
Building, Civil Society
Development Assistance
Inside Target Country
(i.e. Internal Democracy
Assistance)
Contagion
Training of Judges,
Bureaucrats, Politicians,
Civil Society Personnel
Outside Target Country
(i.e. External Democracy Assistance)
                                                                                                                
Table Two
Democracy Assistance
Goal
Democracy Promotion Democracy Protection
Political Liberalization /
Democratization
Consolidation of
Democracy
Individual
Citizens
Civic Education (esp.
Electoral) Civic Education
Civil
Society
PVOs / NGOs /
Interest Groups* / Media
PVOs / NGOs /
Interest Groups / Media
Political
Society
Political Parties / Interest
Groups Acting as Political
Organizations / Political
Movements
Political Parties
T
a
rg
e
t 
Le
v
e
l
State Constitution (Writing /Reform)
Judiciary / Legislature /
Police / Military/
Decentralization
* For the distinctions between PVOs, NGOs, and Interest Groups, see text
(endnote 16)
Remarks: (1) Some forms of assistance appear in more than one cell because
donors implement them in different transition phases; (2) dark gray cells
indicate the most appropriate forms of DPP given the specific transition phase.
